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I. INTRODUCfiON 
Some ten years ago we began to put together a coursebook 
in American constitutional law for senior undergraduates. In the 
initial proposal we sent to West Publishing, we wrote, "It takes a 
measure of audacity to produce yet another book in American 
constitutional law. We have done so, however, in an effort to 
relate the cases presented here to important developments in 
American constitutional theory and comparative constitutional 
law." Recognizing the novelty of our approach, and especially 
the uniqueness of our effort systematically to incorporate com-
parative materials, we sought to reassure the publisher that our 
commitment to innovation would not yield a casebook that 
would intimidate or frighten our colleagues (which we preferred 
to the publishers' term-the "market"). Thus, we noted that 
undergraduate casebooks typically contain 90 to 150 cases. Our 
survey of six widely used books revealed around 90 cases com-
mon to all. Our plan was to include most of this "common core" 
of cases, organized "in a conventional way," so that our book, 
innovation notwithstanding, would "appeal to teachers unwilling 
to depart from the traditional format of the typical constitutional 
law course .... " 
Although we did not then employ the terminology, concern 
about the canon, about what it included and what it left out, was 
never very far from the surface of our project. Moreover, we 
began with the sense that what the canon was, and what it should 
be, must depend heavily upon the audience. One audience was 
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the market, or the academic (interpretive?) community. A sec-
ond consisted of undergraduate students, most of whom we as-
sumed would be enrolled in a traditional liberal arts curriculum. 
(We think, however, that the book would be equally useful in 
law schools.) These two audiences, one of which could be said to 
know the canon by virtue of their standing, the other not yet ini-
tiated into the fold, informed our approach to the canon no less 
than our commitment to the integration of comparative constitu-
tional materials. From the outset, we hoped to replicate the 
canon and to remake it. 
II. REPLICATING THE CANON: ADVENTURES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRYPTOZOOGRAPHY 
Any effort to replicate the canon- assuming one exists, and 
we did-begins with a sense of what the cryptoid looks like. At 
its most accessible and least interesting level of abstraction, a 
constitutional law canon might be simply "canonical cases." This 
is where we began ten years ago. Without the benefit of Gold-
man's later study, we simply sent a graduate student out tope-
ruse the table of contents for five or six of the leading case books. 
We concluded that 90 or so cases appeared in most of the case-
books, but we made no effort at greater precision. For our pur-
poses, the canon could be conceived simply in terms of "expecta-
tions" -what cases would most professors expect to be included 
in the ordinary casebook? The results did not much differ from 
what we would have expected, had we simply sat down and 
guessed a list of cases. 
Goldman's study systematized this approach to the canon.1 
Drawing from twelve casebooks and a total of 552 cases, Gold-
man found that only three cases, or less than one percent of the 
total inventory, were common to all twelve works. Even with 
certain allowances, Goldman could find only ten shared cases. 
His conclusion, then, was that "Public law has a canon, but it ap-
pears a trifling one." 
There are, of course, profound methodological and episte-
mological difficulties with Goldman's approach. Any one of us 
could find plenty of reason to criticize a concept of a canon that 
is case-centered, for example. Before entertaining some of those 
1. See generally Jerry Goldman, Is There a Canon of Constitutional Law?, Am. 
Pol. Sci. Ass'n News!. (Law and Courts Section of the Am. Political Science Ass'n, Spring 
1993). 
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criticisms, though, it might be useful to start by seeing if Gold-
man's results still hold. We hired an undergraduate to conduct a 
similar study.2 We constructed a database of fourteen case-
books, most of which are directed to undergraduates (Appendix 
A). These books yielded a total of 697 cases. Only eleven cases 
appeared in every casebook (Appendix B). If one relaxes the 
criteria for "canonicity" to replication in 90% of the casebooks, 
the list of cases expands to twenty-one cases (Appendix C). 
There are few surprises in the lists.3 
In what sense can a list of cases be said to be canonical? Is a 
canonical listing of cases a canonical curriculum? The question 
points to one of the most obvious and most significant of prob-
lems that inheres in a definition of the canon that reduces it to 
cases. One of us (Finn) teaches constitutional law in a depart-
ment where the course is taught also by another member of the 
faculty. For much of the semester our students study the same 
cases, and in much the same order. Early in the term, therefore, 
two groups of students learn Marbury at pretty much the same 
time, and then McCulloch and then Roe and Casey and so on. 
We think it fair to say, however, that these two groups of stu-
dents would find it difficult to speak to each other in any mean-
ingful way about the cases. One group's approach to the cases 
tends to be policy oriented and attentive to issues of interest 
group politics. (The instructor uses David O'Brien's well-known 
casebook.) Our approach, on the other hand, is driven by con-
cerns for constitutional theory and comparative inquiry, and the 
casebook we use reflects those interests. 
The most concrete manifestation of difference within the 
canonical list of cases, of course, is in how cases are edited. For 
example, some casebooks (such as Foster & Leeson), do not in-
clude the passages from Justice Powell's concurring opinion in 
Chadha (1983) that address the two ways one branch may violate 
the doctrine of separation of powers, whereas many others do 
include the passage. The process of editing cases is tedious but 
critically important, especially when, ~s in our work, the cases 
are meant to illuminate recurring themes or principles. Beyond 
this, though, is the gelatinous character of the materials them-
2. We thank Andrew Calica of the Wesleyan University Class of '01 for his assis· 
tance. 
3. The Kommers-Finn casebook missed just one, Reynolds v. Sims (1964), thus 
suggesting that our casual methodology of "expectations" was remarkably accurate. 
4. See generally Donald P. Kommers and John E. Finn, American ConstitUJiona/ 
Law: Essays, Cases, and Comparative Notes (West/Wadsworth, 1998). 
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selves. The same case-and the same passages in that case-
may be put in forms that give them very different meanings. A 
canon of cases, or what Bloom has called the teaching canon,5 
does not necessarily yield a canonical curriculum. Different 
pedagogical approaches may use the same cases for very differ-
ent purposes. 
The location of cases and subjects may also vary considera-
bly. We suspect there is a loosely defined constitutional law 
canon that governs the organization of materials and cases. As 
Balkin and Levinson have observed, many of the older case-
books began with issues surrounding constitutional amendment.6 
In many of the earlier editions of Cushman, for example, the 
first topic was "Amendments to the Constitution," and the first 
case covered was Hawke v. Smith (1920).7 In a polity that con-
tinually wrestles with questions about identity and the constitu-
tion of the body politic, as well as with issues about the limits of 
judicial power, there are good reasons to include Hawke in most 
casebooks, but it does not appear in any of the casebooks we 
surveyed. 
Our survey of casebooks revealed a fairly standard order of 
progression. Nearly every book began with a chapter on the rise 
of judicial power or with a chapter on constitutional interpreta-
tion, followed by chapters on the separation of powers (usually 
divided into chapters on the executive and the legislature), and 
followed by chapters on the commerce clause and federalism. 
There was more variation in the organization of chapters on the 
Bill of Rights, but the topics tended consistently to center 
around speech, religion, property, substantive due process, and 
equal protection. 
This loose canon of progression, what Bloom has called "a 
map of the territory,''8 is much more significant than a canon of 
cases. Unlike the canon of cases, it is a canon that more clearly 
reflects shared understandings in the academy about what con-
stitutional law is and how an education in it should proceed. The 
persistence of opening chapters on the rise and the consequences 
of the authority of the Supreme Court and the doctrine of judi-
5. See Lynn z. Bloom, The Essay Canon, 61 College English, No. 4 at 401 (1999). 
Bloom distinguishes between the teaching canon and the "critical" canon. 
6. See J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 963,1010 (1998). 
7. See generally Robert Eugene Cushman, Leading Constitutional Decisions (F.S. 
Crofts & Co., 3d ed. 1933). 
8. Bloom, 61 College English at 403 (cited in note 5). 
2000] SYMPOSIUM: FINN & KOMMERS 223 
cial review, for example, reflects concerns about the tensions be-
tween judicial review and democratic theory, concerns that have 
dominated scholarship in the academy at least since the court 
crisis of the 1930s. For an earlier generation, giving pride of 
place to the amendment process may have reflected scholarly 
concern with issues of institutional design. Equally important, it 
may have reflected the composition of the academy itself. As 
Balkin and Levinson note, giving pride of place to the issues 
concerning constitutional amendment may have reflected "the 
interests of political scientists, who still dominated the field in 
the early part of the century."9 
The concept of a canonical curriculum pushes toward a 
shared sense of what constitutes knowledge of a discipline, in-
deed, of what the discipline is. Our casebook sought to replicate 
this canon too. We suspected, rightly as it turned out, that any 
significant departure from expectations would unsettle "the 
market." Concerns about how successful our mimicry of this 
canon was, and about the wisdom of our departures from it, sur-
faced throughout the review process. One of our reviewers, for 
example, complained loudly about our initial plan to cover first 
amendment issues in the last two chapters instead of earlier in 
the text (we later acceded to this view). And we agonized over 
how to organize the two chapters on the commerce clause and 
federalism. 10 Even now, neither of us teaches those chapters in 
the order in which they appear in the book, and they are prime 
candidates for reorganization should a second edition appear. 
Finally, the notion of a canon of progression raises issues 
about what topics must be covered and which ones, if any, may 
be safely omitted. In our experience, the most important ques-
tion concerned the inclusion or exclusion of constitutional crimi-
nal law cases. Here the tension between "expectations" and 
pedagogical approach seemed especially pronounced. Neither of 
us includes the topic when we teach constitutional law, and both 
of us are convinced that the pedagogical approach we favor does 
not require its inclusion. Nevertheless, we contemplated a chap-
ter on criminal procedure, in large measure because the pub-
lisher believed many users would expect it. (We did include 
9. Balkin and Levinson, 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 1010 (cited in note 6). 
10. In our chapter on the judiciary, we deviated slightly from the traditional empha-
sis on issues of standing and justiciability by including extracts from Dred Scott, Brown v. 
Board of Education, and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Each of these cases illustrates the 
expansion of the Supreme Court's powers in the American political system. 
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Hurtado, Twining, Palko, Adamson, and Duncan, but only for 
the purpose of illustrating the debate both on and off the bench 
over the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment. We also included Gregg v. Georgia, but it 
appears after Casey in our chapter on "liberty and person-
hood.") 
In sum, we began with the premise that there is a canon of 
constitutional law and that it has at least two dimensions, one 
consisting of cases, and one of organization. Its familiarity to 
most of us suggests that the canon is a comfortable refuge, and 
we had no desire to upset it. Instead, we sought to replicate it, 
noting explicitly in our Preface that "we hope ... teachers accus-
tomed to the canon will find much that is familiar .... " We did 
so, in part, because we (and the publisher) wanted a book that 
could appeal to a wide audience of potential users. But we 
sought to do more than simply replicate the canon-we hoped 
also to remake it. 
III. MAKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
CANON COMPARATIVE 
Much of our concern about the canon was a consequence of 
a larger, prescriptive purpose: We wanted to change the way 
American constitutional law is taught and how it is studied in 
liberal arts institutions. We began with the conviction that the 
study of constitutional law is an integral part of, and should draw 
upon, a liberal arts education. We tried to produce a casebook 
that will encourage students to think critically about the Ameri-
can political order and to engage the great questions of political 
life that the Constitution and constitutional interpretation ad-
dress. 
Following more or less a canonical format in terms of pres-
entation, we began each chapter with an introductory essay, fol-
lowed by edited cases and then by notes and queries. We de-
signed all three formats to highlight three basic themes, or 
perspectives, each of which is meant to facilitate critical thinking 
and to draw upon skills and knowledge central to the liberal arts. 
Our first theme, the interpretive perspective, stresses the nature 
and processes of constitutional interpretation. Our second 
theme, the normative perspective, invites students to consider 
how constitutional argument, both at the founding and in our 
time, has concentrated on a few basic conflicts, such as the ten-
sion between constitutionalism and democracy, and between the 
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values of liberty and community. Our third theme, and the most 
ambitious in terms of remaking the canon, is the importance of a 
comparative perspective. It represents our belief that the great 
variety and richness of comparative materials should inform the 
study of American constitutional law. We stress that the inclu-
sion of such materials does involve reworking the canon; only 
rarely, if ever, do casebooks on American constitutional law in-
tegrate material from foreign jurisdictions. 
We believe the time has arrived to incorporate foreign con-
stitutional materials into the standard course in American consti-
tutional law. Comparative constitutional law has developed into 
a vibrant legal discipline, one impressive sign of which is the re-
cent publication of a major course book in the field.u The field's 
emergence has been made possible by the explosion of constitu-
tion-writing around the world but also, and mainly, by the rich 
and voluminous jurisprudence of postwar constitutional courts, 
especially those of Germany, Italy, India, Austria, and Japan. 
Enriching this jurisprudence even further is the work-product of 
more recently created tribunals, such as the Spanish, Hungarian, 
and South African constitutional courts, not to mention Cana-
dian judicial opinions under the 1982 Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms or the spiraling caselaw of the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
What we are witnessing is nothing less than the globaliza-
tion of constitutionalism. As Sujit Choudhry writes, "Constitu-
tional interpretation across the globe is taking on an increasingly 
cosmopolitan character, as comparative jurisprudence comes to 
assume a central place in constitutional adjudication. "12 One 
sign of this global phenomenon is the increasing frequency with 
which constitutional courts around the world cite one another. 
Another is the routine practice of some tribunals, such as Can-
ada's Supreme Court and South Africa's Constitutional Court, 
to seek guidance in international and comparative law for the 
resolution of domestic constitutional conflicts.13 
11. See generally Vicki C. Jackson and Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Foundation Press, 1999). 
12 Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 74 Ind. L.J. 819, 820 (1999). 
13. Still another sign of this global phenomenon is the extent to which constitu-
tional judges from various countries meet with one another to discuss common issues and 
problems arising under their respective constitutions. Examples of such meetings are the 
biennial conferences of the presidents of European constitutional courts as well as inter-
national seminars and symposia in which scholars and judges exchange views on interpre-
tive and other issues arising out of constitutional adjudication in their respective coun-
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Our casebook, then, began with a clear sense about the 
ways in which the canon of constitutional law should be con-
ceived and hence about how it should be taught. In our view, 
the canon, however defined, was introverted and insular. We set 
out to overcome this. In doing so, we were confronted first with 
elemental questions about how and why canons change. Second, 
we were forced to consider difficult questions about which kinds 
of new materials ought to be canonized and why some qualified 
and others did not. 
A. THE HOWS AND THE WHYS OF CANONICAL CHANGE 
A canon is a communal academic enterprise; where it exists, 
it does so because there are shared understandings, patent or 
otherwise, about what comprises the canon and what functions it 
serves. We do not mean to suggest that these characteristics and 
presuppositions are monolithic. It might be better to describe 
them as familial in nature, with lots of variations in different 
parts of the family tree. This communal character means that 
canonical change is similarly a shared enterprise. The canon 
changes, if we may borrow the phrase, in response to the felt ne-
cessities of the academic or interpretive community. 
We are uncomfortable with the concept of an "interpretive 
community," for its use too often has been uncritical. Its propo-
nents have tended to assume, first, that the community is funda-
mentally egalitarian and democratic, when in fact there are pro-
found disparities of influence, power, and position in it. These 
disparities are likely to have an effect on the composition of the 
canon. Second, they have not given enough attention to who 
comprises the community. The identity of the community, and 
the interests of its members, are equally likely to have a pro-
nounced impact on the canon the community produces, as we 
saw when we considered the canon of progression and how it dif-
fers from an earlier generation of casebooks. 
Our effort to remake the canon should be understood as a 
claim about who comprises the academic community, which in 
tum influences which necessities will be felt and which will go 
tries. Some American Supreme Court justices have participated in these meetings. See, 
e.g., Justices at Work: A Comparative Constitutional Symposium, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1609-1873 (1997). The most recent of these conferences, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist 
participated, took place at the Georgetown Law Center on September 17, 1999, where 
judges and scholars from a number of countries met to discuss the meaning and uses of 
comparative constitutional law. 
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unheard. In our view, the globalization of constitutional law 
means an inevitable expansion of the academic community. 
More than ever, there is an international community of academ-
ics, judges and lawyers that wrestles with problems that are fun-
damentally transnational in constitutional character. Indeed, 
that community is a visible professional presence in most of the 
world, notwithstanding its relative invisibility in the American 
academic community. The internationalization of a community 
concerned with constitutional questions and issues represents 
both a challenge to the canon and an opportunity to rework it. 
We doubt whether Americans can any longer ignore the ideas 
and practices of other nations with liberal constitutions designed 
for the governance of modem, secular, and pluralistic societies. 
There is a danger in conceptualizing a canon as a shared en-
terprise, influenced substantially by changes outside the commu-
nity that have a profound influence on the identity of that com-
munity. Put simply, the danger is of reification. Arguably, a 
canon that is a collaborative enterprise is everyone's responsi-
bility and no one's responsibility. Thus, "[m]uch of what is ca-
nonical is not the result of conscious planning but of the seren-
dipitous development of the ever-shifting contours of a culture, a 
discipline, or an interpretive community."14 It is worth adding, 
too, that when a canon has a commercial component-and a 
casebook that doesn't sell is unlikely to have much of an impact 
on the canon in the long run- the autonomy of its practitioners 
is even further circumscribed. 
The danger of reification is why concern about what com-
prises the canon warrants scholarly inquiry. It also, in our view, 
imposes obligations on authors. To fail to think about what the 
canon is, and what it should be, is to forfeit (what remains of) 
our intellectual autonomy and responsibility for how we educate 
students. A canon is at once a creation, whether serendipitous 
or deliberate, and a creator. A canon, in other words, creates a 
particular kind of student and citizen, who knows certain kinds 
of things and, more importantly, has acquired particular ways of 
thinking and knowing. A canon is more than a pedagogy- it is a 
pedagogue. 
14. Balkin and Levinson, 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 995 (cited in note 6). 
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B. CRITERIA FOR CANONICITY 
Which new materials ought to be elevated to the canon? 
Any answer to this question relies on some sense, implicit or ex-
plicit, about what the canon is good for. Or more expansively, it 
depends on what we think an education into the wonders of con-
stitutional law is good for, if anything. Is the purpose to frighten 
students away from or to welcome them into the professional 
education of the law? One function of an undergraduate educa-
tion in constitutional law might be described as gatekeeping. 
Students sometimes use such courses to self-select in or out of 
the law school game. It would not be difficult to create a canon 
to facilitate this purpose. We might, for example, seek a canon 
that is largely doctrinal, ahistorical, and best suited to the 
Gilbert's or Nutshell treatment. 
Alternatively, it might be that the gatekeeping function is 
ours. Perhaps courses on constitutional law are tracking devices: 
Our best students win grades that are like tickets to the best law 
schools, our B students go somewhere else, and those that don't 
cut it get a consolation prize on their way out the door. The 
ideal canon here, much like the one above, helps us winnow. So 
we might construct a canon that separates wheat from chaff. 
We began with the premise, instead, that an education in 
constitutional law should be an integral part of a liberal arts edu-
cation and not simply, or even at all, a part of a preprofessional 
education. An education in constitutional law, we concluded, 
should be an education that goes beyond the facts and rulings of 
particular cases to engage the great questions about constitu-
tional interpretation and the nature of our polity. Seen from this 
perspective, a constitutional law course can be, and is, no less 
than an extended commentary on the meaning of America. 
This purpose greatly influenced our sense about where and 
how we should change the canon. We tried to integrate selected 
comparative materials into our text while maintaining its charac-
ter as a casebook on American constitutional law. We hoped 
that these comparative materials would provide a springboard 
for fresh reflection on the American Constitution. The point, in 
other words, was to incorporate foreign materials that would il-
luminate particular aspects of American constitutional experi-
ence.15 
15. In part through what has been called, unfortunately, the process of "defamil-
iarization." 
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Foreign judicial cases often scrutinize practical problems 
left largely unexamined by the U.S. Supreme Court. They also 
employ interpretive methods and modes of judicial review that 
contrast sharply with American approaches to constitutional 
analysis. These methods and modes often emphasize balance 
and equilibrium in constitutional interpretation, the harmoniza-
tion of conflicting rights and values, and a perspective that envi-
sions the constitution as a unified structure of principles and val-
ues. By contrast, the American Supreme Court often seems to 
issue categorical rulings, to award total victory to one side in a 
conflicting rights dispute, and to interpret particular provisions 
of the Constitution in a less holistic fashion. On the other hand, 
comparative materials may reinforce a student's views of the 
strength, integrity, or superiority of American constitutional 
policies. 
In short, the comparative perspective enriches the study of 
constitutional law in several ways. First, by looking at foreign 
modes of constitutional governance, students may begin to dis-
cern what is purely historical and contingent in the American 
experience and what is more universal and permanent. Second, 
Americans may take some pride in knowing something about 
the extent to which their constitutional practices and ideals are 
embedded in the provisions and features of other constitutional 
democracies. Third, they may also find great value in the dis-
tinctive aspects of foreign constitutions and the often sharp con-
trasts to American law found in foreign constitutional doctrine. 
We devoted a good deal of thought to considering precisely 
how the canon should be modified to suit these changes in ca-
nonical purpose. The most obvious change, and the simplest, 
would be simply to add to the canon by incorporating decisions 
from other jurisdictions. Even this simplest of approaches raises 
problems. Which cases should we include and from which juris-
dictions? We decided to draw upon the decisional law and con-
stitutions of countries which face social and political problems 
similar to those of the United States in the past half-century, 
which share constitutional language and texts similar to the 
United States Constitution, and whose supreme judicial tribunals 
play roles analogous to that of the Supreme Court. We drew 
primarily, but not exclusively, from Germany, Canada, Japan, 
South Africa, Ireland, and the Council of Europe. 
We chose foreign cases that raised serious questions about 
judicial interpretation in the United States. The reasoning in 
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South Africa's death penalty case/6 for example, in which Gregg 
v. Georgia is discussed-and criticized-at great length, gives 
students an entirely different perspective on the American case. 
For one thing, the standards used by South Africa's Constitu-
tional Court for determining what is a "cruel and unusual" pun-
ishment are very different from those used by the American Su-
preme Court. In addition, the South African Court advances a 
different (and more sublime) view of human dignity. We often 
find that students are quite surprised to see, as they do in the 
South African case, that there are alternative visions of liberty, 
equality, and personhood.17 
A similar issue arose concerning format. As we indicated 
earlier, the canon is no less about structure and progression than 
it is about cases. In particular, both substance and format invite 
the reader to approach the text in a particular kind of way. Inso-
far as our purpose was to create students who could draw upon 
and advance the skills of critical learning that are characteristic 
of an education in the liberal arts, we sought to structure and 
present the materials in ways that invited students to be active 
participants instead of passive readers. Asking students simply 
to read may yield students who can't do much else. Moreover, 
reading the word may produce students-and citizens-that ac-
cept as natural and inevitable a constitutional order in which the 
production of constitutional meaning is an enterprise entrusted 
only to judges and not to citizens.18 
Such concerns informed our approach to questions that 
might otherwise seem merely mechanical. Should we simply edit 
and integrate comparative case law into the standard, edited case 
format? Or should we utilize the materials in some other way? 
16. See State v. Makwayane & Mchunu, 6 June 1995. 
17. Another example of a non-American case that illuminates important issues of 
American constitutional law is Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 European Rights Reports 
149 (1981), decided by the European Court of Human Rights. It is a wonderful contrast 
to Bowers v. Hardwick, and it exemplifies the simple (or simplistic?) innocence of the 
opinions by Justices White and Blackmun. Arguably, for both White and Blackmun 
Bowers was an easy case; both accept uncritically the formulaic methodology of funda-
mental rights. For White, no such right existed in Bowers, and hence the state won easily. 
Blackmun's conclusion in favor of Hardwick was no less simple or predictable. The 
European Court, in contrast, engaged in a sophisticated and sensitive balancing of the 
important interests of both state and individual, finding that in the case of Northern Ire-
land, despite its valid interest in regulating sexual morality, there was no "pressing need" 
to criminalize homosexual conduct. Dudgeon thus provides students with a different 
perspective on the issues raised in Bowers, not the least of which is how individual rights 
are to be reconciled with the community's prevailing conceptions of morality. 
18. See also Bloom, 61 College English at 419-20 (cited in note 5). 
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We did not want to introduce long extracts from foreign cases or 
the secondary literature. We certainly did not want to convey 
the impression that we were producing a book in comparative 
constitutional law. As already noted, ours was designed as a 
book in American constitutional law. And we wanted to organ-
ize the comparative materials in a way that would allow teachers 
and students to use the book even if they were not interested in 
covering the comparative materials. 
We chose to incorporate the comparative dimension in 
three ways. First, we reserved the concluding section of each in-
troductory essay for a review of comparable foreign develop-
ments. Second, we included boxes featuring extracts from for-
eign cases or applicable provisions from foreign constitutions, 
carefully spliced into the text so as to focus on points of special 
interest. Finally, we raised comparative (along with normative 
and interpretive) issues in the notes and queries following each 
case. Our insertion of comparative materials was thus selective 
and largely for the purpose of illustrating issues and problems of 
American constitutional law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Balkin and Levinson have argued that scholarly concern 
about the canon is most likely to appear at "times of ferment, 
growth, change, and innovation" in an academic discipline.19 To 
this extent, debate about the canon may be seen as a conflict 
about what the discipline is, indeed, about what constitutes 
knowledge. Any effort to engage the canon, then, and in our 
case, to work fundamental changes in it, is also an effort to 
change the discipline. Consequently, although the ostensible 
and first audience for the canon is the student, its larger audi-
ence is the academic community. 
19. Balkin and Levinson, 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 969 (cited in note 6). 
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APPENDIXB 
CANONICAL CASES I 
Cases in all fourteen casebooks: 
Marbury v. Madison (1803) 
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983) 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority (1985) 
Lochner v. New York (1905) 
Roe v. Wade (1973) 
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 
Employment Division Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith (1990) 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 
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APPENDIXC 
CANONICAL CASES II 
Cases in 90% (13/14) or more of casebooks: 
Marbury v. Madison (1803) 
U.S. v. Nixon (1974) 
Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 
Gibbons v. Ogden (1819) 
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983) 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority (1985) 
Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934) 
Lochner v. New York (1905) 
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
Roe v. Wade (1973) 
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health (1990) 
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 
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Employment Division Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith (1990) 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) 
